Journal of Dispute Resolution
Volume 1990

Issue 1

Article 7

1990

Catch-22 of Mandatory Summary Jury Trials, The
Daniel K. O'Toole

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel K. O'Toole, Catch-22 of Mandatory Summary Jury Trials, The, 1990 J. Disp. Resol. (1990)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

O'Toole: O'Toole: Catch-22 of Mandatory Summary Jury Trials

COMMENT
THE CATCH-22*
OF MANDATORY
SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception nearly ten years ago, the summary jury trial has received
almost unanimous acclaim as an extremely effective means of inducing settlement
and avoiding protracted litigation.' The settlement technique continued to be
used with virtually no opposition 2 until some courts began using the summary
jury trial as a mandatory settlement mechanism. 3 Within the federal court
system, a split of authority has developed as to the permissibility of a trial judge
imposing a summary jury trial settlement procedure on litigants. 4 Strandell v.
Jackson County, Ill.5 and McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 6 are two of the more
* Catch-22 is defined as "a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a
circumstance inherent in the problem . . . [or] a situation presenting two equally undesirable
alternatives." WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 215 (9th ed. 1983).
1. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Bertelsman, More on Summary
Jury Trials, 52 Ky. BENCH & BAR, April 1988, at 28; Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L.
REv. 829, 834 (1986); Ranii, New Spurs to Settlement: Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor,NAT'L L.J.,
June 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6; Lambros, The FederalRulesof Civil Procedure:A New AdversarialModel
for a New Era, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 800-02 (1989); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trialand Other
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States
Committee on the Operationof the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461,499-518 (1984) [hereinafter Lambros,
The Summary Trial](collection of letters to Judge Lambros detailing the successes of numerous judges
when experimenting with summary jury trials).
2. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and OtherMethods ofAlternative Dispute Resolution: Some
CautionaryObservations,53 U. CHt. L. REV. 366 (1986). Judge Posner's criticism is not aimed at the
summary jury trial process. Rather, he questions the undoubted fidelity of the advocates of the
summary jury trial in light of an absence of scientific evidence to substantiate the claims that summary
jury trials are an effective settlement technique. See also Developments in "Alternative" Dispute
Resolution: An Overview, 115 F.R.D. 361, 371 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. I1. 1987).
4. Compare McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988) with Strandell v.
Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). For other recent cases upholding the power of
courts to order participation in summary jury trials see Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119
F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D.
603 (D. Minn. 1988); Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Century Bank, 695 F.Supp. 1343, 1347 n.3 (D.
Mass. 1988); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
5. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). Strandell stands alone as ihe only case rejecting the alleged
power of federal courts to order parties to participate in a summary jury trial. One writer posits that
the absence of decisions similar to Strandell is probably due to the difficulty of appealing discovery
orders. Comment, The Mandatory Summary Jury Trial in Federal Court: FoundationallyFlawed, 16
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 251, 258 n.44 (1989) (authored by Nina Jill Spiegel).
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recent cases dealing with this issue and represent opposing viewpoints. Through
these cases the author will explore the opposing positions of those courts and
propose what the author believes is the inherent flaw in forcing litigants to
participate in a summary jury trial against their wishes, regardless of whether the
participants are allowed to "hold back" on information otherwise protected under
the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 Before delving into
the issue, however, it may be helpful to discuss the structure of the summary jury
trial and its use in the federal courts.
The summary jury trial was created in 1980 by Judge Thomas Lambros of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in response to an8
ever-increasing volume of cases which were inundating the court system. 9
Today, summary jury trials have been used in approximately 100 federal courts
experiment with the settlement
and in approximately 1,000 cases. 10 Judges who 11
technique continue to report favorable reactions.
The summary jury trial was designed as a half-day proceeding in which
lawyers representing the parties to a dis]3ute would present a summary of their
The jury is selected from the same
respective cases to a six-member jury.'
pool of potential jurors from which regular petit jurors are drawn. 13 The halfday proceeding begins with the judge conducting a short voir dire of the tenmember venire in a "show of hands" fashion. 14 The parties are then permitted

6. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
8. Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980); Lambros, The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 789,
798 (1989) [hereinafter Lambros, A New Adversarial Model]. For examples of articles questioning the
existence (or continued existence) of a "litigation explosion" see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 63 (1983) and Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work
of the Devil? A Current Assessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REv. _ (1990).
9. Lambros, A New Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 802 (1989). In an article to be
published in the University of Oregon Law Review, Professor Shirley Wiegand notes that in a recent
telephone conversation, Judge Lambros estimated that summary jury trials may have been used by as
many as 150-200 federal judges. Wiegand, supra note 8, it.
10. Lambros, A New Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 802.
11. See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial, supra note 1.
12. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 43; Lambros, A New Adversarial Model, supra note 8,
at 801.
13. Some writers have expressed the concern that using regular jurors as summary jury trial
jurors, without informing them that their verdict is only advisory, will "poison" the jury pool. The
concern is that a normal jury might wrongly believe that its verdict is not binding and thus not consider
the evidence and deliberate with the same seriousness of a normal jury. See, e.g., Wiegand, supra note
8, at _.
14. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 47 n.20. By "show of hands" fashion, Lambros means
that jurors are questioned as a group instead of individually and jurors raise their hands in response
to questions instead of answering verbally.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss1/7

2

O'Toole: O'Toole: Catch-22 of Mandatory Summary Jury Trials
1990]

MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY TRIAL

two peremptory strikes each to arrive at a six-member jury. 15 The voir dire
stage of the proceeding is designed to last no more than fifteen minutes. 16 After
jury selection, the summary jury trial proceeds to the argument stage.
The argument stage of the summary jury trial varies significantly from 17a
normal jury trial in that all evidence is presented exclusively through counsel.
Each side is allotted one hour in which to present a summary, of the evidence it
would expect to present in an actual trial of the case.1
Judge Lambros
advocates that objections and procedural maneuvering be kept to a minimum so
as to allow each party an uninterrupted presentation. 19 When the attorneys
conclude their presentations, the jury then receives an abbreviated instruction on
the law, retires for deliberations, and later returns to announce its verdict. 20 The
verdict, of course, is non-binding and is meant only as a catalyst to more
productive settlement discussions. 2 1 Once the verdict is announced, the judge
and the parties hold a short conference at which they discuss the verdict and
establish a timetable for settlement discussions. 2 2 If no settlement is ultimately
reached, the case is set for trial. The above description represents the summary
jury trial as it was designed by Judge Lambros. Other judges employ numerous
permutations of the summary jury trial to better adapt the procedure to the case
in which it is being administered.2 3
The summary jury trial was not designed to be used randomly in any case.
Judge Lambros suggests that the procedure be used only in that class of cases in
which the primary obstacle to meaningful settlement discussions is an uncertainty
as to how a jury will determine a specific issue such as the infamous reasonable
man standard.2 4 In this manner, the advisory verdict may serve as a predictive

15. Id.
16. Id. at 47 n.20.
17. Id. at 48-50. Many lawyers conduct the presentation of witness testimony by reading from
the depositions of the witnesses.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 48.
21. Id. at 43.
22. Id. at 48. At the post-verdict conference, the attorneys and parties are allowed to discuss the
case with the jurors in order to more fully understand the verdict and to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the case and their methods of presentation. Judge Lambros advocates at least a two
week wait before setting the case for trial in order to allow the parties to digest the jury's verdict and
conduct further settlement discussions.
23. E.g., Lambros, The Summary Jury Tria4 supra note 1, at 475-476. In his most recent article
on summary jury trials, Judge Lambros suggests that judges and lawyers "should not hesitate to modify
the procedure as they see fit to meet the demands of the cases before them." Lambros, A New
Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 798-99.
24. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial, supra note 1, at 469. Judge Lambros notes, however,
that the summary jury trial technique has been used in a great variety of cases including products
liability, patent and copyright infringement, antitrust, and employment cases. Lambros, A New
Adversarial Mode4 supra note 8, at 799.
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tool to dispel some of the uncertainty which often works as an impediment to
settlement. 25 As Judge Lambros proposes, "[a]ll participants should recognize
that another
jury would probably return a similar verdict if the case were to go to
, 26
trial.
II. BASIS OF THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Judge Lambros asserts that the summary jury trial procedure is firmly rooted
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). 27 Against the backdrop of
FRCP 1, mandating that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action,'" 2 8 the procedure rests mainly
within the court's pretrial powers under FRCP 16.29 Rule 16(a)(5) allows the
court, in its discretion, to "direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it . . . for such purposes as ... (5) facilitating the
settlement of the case." 30 FRCP 16(c) also allows the parties to
consider and take action with respect to . . (7) the possibility of
settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute;
...(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potential-

25. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 45. Judge Lambros believes that one of the greatest
impediments to settlement is uncertainty as to how a jury might decide an issue of fact in the case. The
advisory jury verdict therefore allows the parties to conduct settlement negotiations from a more
informed and rational basis rather than under a possibly unrealistic belief as to how the jury will view
the evidence.
26. Lambros, A New Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 800. Some question how reliable a
In her
predictive tool the summary jury trial's advisory verdict is. Wiegand, supra note 8, at _.
article, Professor Wiegand catalogues several summary jury trials in which two advisory juries were
used. After witnessing the identical presentation of evidence at the summary jury trial, the two
advisory juries split up, deliberated separately, and returned separate verdicts. The verdicts were
drastically different. See, e.g., Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, No. 84-299 (W. Mich. 1987) (where
one summary jury trial jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the other summary jury trial jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $2.8 million); Muehler v. Land 0' Lakes, Inc., 617 F. Supp.
1370 (D.C. Minn. 1985) (one group of summary jury trial jurors found for the defendants and the other
group awarded plaintiff $2.92 million); Willging, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 77 (1987)
(reporting situation in which one summary jury. trial jury absolved all defendants and the other
summary jury trial jury absolved some defendants but awarded $8.3 million against remaining
defendants). See also Compressed Gas Corp. v. United States Steel Corp., 857 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.
1988) (where summary jury trial jury awarded $200,000 in damages to plaintiff and regular jury
awarded more than $1.76 million in damages to plaintiff).
27. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 51-52. For recent cases finding a mandatory summary
jury trial to be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure see Fed. Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120
F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
28. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
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ly difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues,
and
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems;
31
(11) such matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
As further support of the summary jury trial's consistency with the federal rules,
jury trial and the
Judge Lambros notes the similarity between the summary
32
advisory jury whose use is warranted in FRCP 39(c).
These rules seem to be consistent with the summary jury trial when the
summary jury trial is conducted with the consent of the parties. 33 This is
especially true when considered in conjunction with the notes of the advisory
committee to FRCP 16(c)(7). The Advisory Committee notes explain that Rule
16 "does not make settlement conferences mandatory because they would be a
waste of times in many cases" and the purpose of the rule is not "to impose
settlement negotiations on unwilling participants" but instead to attempt to foster
settlement negotiations. 34 Problems arise in attempting to harmonize the FRCP
with the practice of court-mandated summary jury trial.
III.

MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY TRIAL

Due, probably, to the remarkable success that judges experience in using the
summary jury trial, some courts have ordered the parties to a lawsuit to participate
35
in a summary jury trial despite the party's or parties' objections to it.
Assuming that the unwilling participant(s) has been ordered to participate in a
mandatory summary jury trial, there are two basic methods by which the judge
might conduct the compulsory summary jury trial. First, the judge might force full
participation in the summary jury trial by imposing sanctions on a participant
rendering a feigned or less than full performance. Second, the judge might not
force full participation, but instead leave the decision to the participants as to how
meaningfully they will participate.
The remainder of this Comment will explore both of the above options and
explain the author's belief that regardless of which of the above two options the
judge chooses, the mandatory summary jury trial will likely be doomed to failure
when forced on unwilling participants. This is the catch-22. The unfortunate
result of the mandatory summary jury trial will be that the summary jury trial,
instead of functioning as a timesaving settlement device, will operate as an added
expense and an added delay to the resolution of the conflict.

31. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1984 draft amendments note).
32. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 52; FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c). Lambros contends that the
primary similarity is the court's opportunity to utilize the jury's perception of the case although it is
not binding.
33. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 52.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee notes.
35. See, e.g., Strandell, 115 F.R.D. 333.
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A. Option One: Mandatory Summary Jury Trial
with the Imposition of Sanctions
for Non-meaningful Participation
It seems fairly obvious why a judge would like to have the power to impose
sanctions upon parties rendering less than meaningful participation at a summary
jury trial. 3 The verdict rendered by the summary jury trial jury which witnessed an incomplete presentation of evidence would not be as good a predictive
37
tool since it would not be based on a fully realistic view of all the evidence.
In order to maximize the settlement inducing characteristic of the advisory verdict,
the parties must participate in the summary jury trial as they would at trial by
putting forth their best evidence and arguments. Only in this way can the
summary jury trial's advisory verdict function as the most accurate indicator of
how a full jury might react to the evidence in the case. 3 8 Forcing the attorneys
at a summary jury trial to produce all of the evidence they would present at trial,
however, may very well lead to fierce objection.
The primary concern of those attorneys who oppose a mandatory summary
jury trial is the apparent conflict between the summary jury trial and the work
product and privilege rules contained in FRCP 26.39 Critics of court-ordered
participation in summary jury trials argue that a summary jury trial would force
a party to reveal matters of work product or privilege that would normally be
protected by FRCP 26.40
The leading example of a case in which a party was ordered to participate in
a summary jury trial despite protests that to do so would reveal trial strategy and
require disclosure of privileged statements of witnesses is Strandell v. Jackson
County, JI1.4 1 Strandell involved a civil rights action filed by the parents of
Michael Strandell against Jackson County, Illinois, for an alleged violation of constitutional rights in the arrest, strip search, imprisonment, and eventual suicidal
death of Michael Strandell. 4 2 Upon noting that the trial of this action would
consume 20-25 days and the court's calendar was not amenable to a trial of this
size at any time in the near future, the District Court ordered the parties to
participate in a summary jury trial.43 Strandell's attorney objected to the order

36. When using the term "non-meaningful participation" I intend to mean that level of
participation in the summary jury trial which will not materially contribute to the parties' understanding
of the case or the reliability of the jury's advisory verdict.
37. Maatman, The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson
County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 484. See also supra note 26.
38. Maatman, supra note 37, at 482 (1988).
39. E.g., Strandel 115 F.R.D. at 336; FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
40. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 336; FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
41. 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987).
634 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. IlL. 1986).
42. Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill.,
43. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334, 336.
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compelling the summary jury trial on the grounds that the court lacked power to
compel a summary jury trial and that his participation in a summary jury trial
would require disclosure of witness statements protected under the discovery rules
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 4 After refusing to take part in the
summary jury trial, Strandell's attorney was found in criminal contempt of court
and fined $500. 45 The attorney, Thomas F. Tobin, filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied.46 On appeal from the denial, the Seventh
Circuit United States Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of contempt finding
that FRCP 16 does not permit courts to compel participation in a summary jury
trial. 47 The Court of Appeals held that compulsory summary jury trials could
easily upset the well-established balance between pretrial disclosure and partial
confidentiality "by requiring disclosure
of information obtainable, if at all, through
48
the mandated discovery process."
The discovery rules contained in rules 26-37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 49 provide for the liberal exchange of information between parties prior
to trial. 50 These rules of discovery do not provide, however, for unlimited
discovery of any information possessed by an opponent. 51 The Advisory
Committee notes to the 1970 amendments to Rule 26 make it clear that Rule
26(b)(3) "protect[s] against disclosure the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation of an attorney or other
representative of a party." 52 Rule 26(b)(3) is just one of several provisions in
53
the discovery rules which either forbids or imposes limitations on discovery.
It appears then, in light of the intent of the discovery procedures to protect some
matters from being discovered, that the mandatory summary jury trial with the
imposition of sanctions to coerce meaningful participation conflicts with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery. Another very real concern

44. Id. at 334.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 336.
47. Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 888. The "process" referred to by the court is the discovery rules imposing time
limitations on parties seeking to obtain statements of witnesses. In Strandell, the attorney representing
Jackson County failed to interview 21 witnesses and had failed to show "substantial need" or "undue
hardship" in order to obtain the statements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(bX3). Strandell's
attorney argued that a summary jury trial in which witness statements would be exposed would allow
Jackson County to obtain information to which it was not entitled. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 885.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
50. Id.
51. See infra note 89.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bX3), advisory committee notes. This material is what is commonly
referred to as "work product" guarded under the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bX3) covering "documents" and "things", Rule 26(b)(4) covering experts,
Rule 26(c) covering protective orders, Rule 34 covering inspection of documents and land, et al.
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of those who oppose mandated summary jury trials is that parties might begin to
use the summary jury trial as a means to discover otherwise undiscoverable
the opponent's case and the strategy the opponent intends
information concerning
54
to employ at trial.
Another recent case dealin with the issue of mandatory summary jury trials
McKay
v. Ashland Oil, Inc.55 McKay involved a suit by two former officers
is
of Ashland Oil alleging that they were wrongfully discharged after refusing to take
part in a scheme of illegal activities involving bribes to officials of Middle Eastern
countries. 56 Over the plaintiffs' objections, Judge Bertelsman of the United
States District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky ordered the parties to a
summary jury trial.5 7 Upon learning of the result in Strandell, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order mandating summary jury trial.58 In his
order denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Bertelsman noted that the
present case "stands on a somewhat different footing than Strandell"because of
the effect of a local rule promulgated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
83 which allows a majority of the district court judges to "make and amend rules
governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules."59 The local rule (Local
Rule 23 of the Joint Local Rules for the United States District Courts for the
Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky) permits a judge to order any civil case
to a summary jury trial or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding. 60 In
contrast to Strandell, the McKay Court read the advisory committee notes to Rule
16 to 1uphold the power of a federal court to force participation in a summary jury
6
trial.

54. Maatman, supra note 37, at 476. This was the situation in Strandell where Strandell's
attorney argued that participation in the summary jury trial would mean divulging information that the
opposing party failed to discover before the time period for discovery had elapsed. Strandell,838 F.2d

at 885.
55. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
56. Id. at 44.
57. Id. at 43-44.
58. Id. at 44.
59. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (emphasis added). Other writers have reached the same result. See,
e.g., Lambros, A New AdversarialModel, supra note 8, at 804; Comment, Compelling Alternatives:
The Authority of FederalJudges to Order Summary Jury Trial Participation,57 FORDHAM L. REv.
483, 499 (1988) (authored by William Craco); Bertelsman, More on Summary Jury Trials, supra note
1; Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerationsfor the Bench and Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599, 60809 (1988); Comment, Compelled Participationin Summary Jury Trials:A Tale of Two Cases, 77 KY.
L.J. 421, 436 (1989) (authored by Paul Mattingly). But see, Maatman, supra note 37; Maatman &
Gilbert, Summary Jury Trial: The Long & Short of It, 2 CBA RECORD, April 1988, at 18, 22;
Comment, The Mandatory Summary Jury Trial in Federal Court: Foundationally Flawed, 16
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 251, 262 (1989) (authored by Nina Jill Spiegel).
60. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 44.
61. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48. The McKay Court relied partially on a resolution of the 1984
Judicial Conference endorsing the experimental use of the summary jury trial. The original resolution

proposed adoption of the summary jury trial but contained language requiring that summary jury trials
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As detailed in the preceding paragraphs, a mandatory summary jury trial can
conflict with the discovery rules when participation in a mandatory summary jury
trial would require divulging work product or other material protected, from
disclosure under the discovery rules. 6 2 From that premise, the local rule in
McKay would be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
thereby invalid since the very rule which permits local rules conditions their
existence on the local rules being "not inconsistent with these rules" (the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). 63 Requiring the parties in a summary jury trial to
divulge work product or other privileged information with threats of sanctions,
then, presents a patent conflict with the discovery rules. 64 There is an alternative to threatening sanctions for non-meaningful participation, but common sense
suggests that the alternative will also be ineffective in securing the goals of the
summary jury trial as a settlement technique.
B. Option Two: Mandatory Summary Jury Trial
without the Imposition of Sanctions
for Non-meaningful Participation
The alternative to coercing meaningful participation by the threat of sanctions
is, of course, to leave the decision to the
parties as to how meaningfully they will
65
participate in the summary jury trial.
According to an analysis of Judge Lambros' theory as originally set out, the
violation of work product and privilege argument would be of dubious validity
since Lambros' theory of summary jury trial would allow an attorney to not
disclose any information that the attorney might deem to be work product or
privilege and then factor in the absence of this information when assessing the
jury's advisory verdict. 6 6 The aforementioned practice of holding back certain

be conducted "only with the voluntary consent of the parties." Report of Judicial Conference
Committee on the Operationof the Jury System Agenda G-13, Page 4, September 1984. When the
final resolution was adopted, however, the quoted language was omitted. Report of the Proceedings
of the Judicial Conference of the United States 88 (1984). The McKay Court used that history as
authority for the proposition that a mandatory summary jury trial does not conflict with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48.
62. Supra note 43.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 83; Maatman, supra note 37, at 473 n.81; Maatman & Gilbert, supra note
59, at 20.
64. Supra note 47.
65. The decision in McKay is based on this premise. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48. The decision,
however, fails to address the wisdom of this practice.
66. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 53-54. This suggested use of the summary jury trial by
Lambros adds further weight to the argument that the summary jury trial was not meant to be imposed
on parties while threatening the use of sanctions for feigned performance. This practice was probably
included by Lambros to avoid violating discovery rules but there is still a question as to whether this
practice of holding back on privileged information will save the usefulness of the summary jury trial
process when the process is imposed on a party contrary to his or her wishes.
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bits of information and then factoring in their absence, while appearing to redeem
the mandatory summary jury trial, is based on the premise that the parties have
only a limited amount of information that they choose not to disclose or that they
will otherwise fully participate. 67 Considering these assumptions in light of the
fact that parties to a lawsuit are cautious in their settlement negotiations for fear
of providing the opponent with information68 he or she might not possess, these
assumptions might prove to be unrealistic.
If judges were to continue to compel parties to submit their cases to a
summary jury trial in hopes of fostering settlement, but fail to require significant
participation through the threat of sanctions, many might ask "why bother?" Why
should the parties to a lawsuit be forced to participate in a summary jury trial if
there will only be feigned participation?
As mentioned earlier, the advisory verdict a jury renders in a summary jury
trial proceeding is a tool which allows the parties the opportunity to discover how
a jury might react to their cause of action. 6 9 However, the advisory verdict is
useful as a settlement tool only inasmuch as it reflects an accurate prediction of
what would occur should the case proceed to trial. 70 A party who does not wish
to participate in a summary jury trial out of fear of revealing work product,
strategy, or privileged material, but who is forced to do so by a judge, will most
likely elect to hold back all of its work product, strategy, or privilege. When the
jury renders its verdict after witnessing a less than full scale trial, the verdict
might well not be7 1a good predictive tool and may very well be useless as a catalyst to settlement.
In the scenario detailed above, a party forced into a summary jury trial may
very well come away from the proceeding with a verdict which is virtually useless
in fostering settlement. This possibly useless verdict will not come, however,
without a price. In addition to the expenses incurred in paying for an attorney
during the summary jury trial and all of the costs to the parties involved, a party
will also pay for the attorney's additional time in preparing for the summary jury
trial. Because of the apparent differences between a summary jury trial and a full
scale trial, preparation for one is likely to be very different than preparation for

67. As noted in note 25, the summary jury trial is effective only inasmuch as it represents an
accurate prediction of how a jury would decide a matter if the case were to go to trial. When a party
participates in a summary jury trial while only revealing a fraction of what would be presented at trial,
the summary jury trial's advisory verdict no longer serves as a predictive tool and hence the parties
occupy the same position they did prior to the summary jury trial; speculating as to how a jury might
view the presentation of evidence at trial.
68. Maalman, supra note 37, at 484.
69. Supra note 25.
70. Maatman, supra note 37, at 482.
71. Id. The usefulness of a summary jury trial verdict which is rendered after the jury witnesses
only a partial exposition of the evidence is reduced even more when considering the unreliability of
the summary jury trial verdict as mentioned in note 26.
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the other. 72 The attorney would first have to determine what evidence he or she
would want to protect and save as work product or privileged material and what
evidence to use at the summary jury trial. Further, if the attorney wanted to
protect a strategy from being discovered and more easily countered at trial, the
creation of an entirely separate summary jury trial strategy might prove extremely
difficult and entail great amounts of extra time and expense. The attorney
participating in a summary jury trial will also have to spend time on planning how
to present all of the evidence of the case within the hour allotted for the presentation of evidence. 73 This may entail preparing summaries of depositions and
interviews or any other technique which might allow an attorney to make a quick
and efficient summary jury trial presentation as opposed to the more thorough and
deliberate exhibition of evidence at a full trial.
In short, the summary jury
trial will require additional expenditures than if the case were to bypass summary
jury trial and proceed directly to trial. The effect, then, of requiring a party to
participate in a summary jury trial which produces an unhelpful verdict is the
imposition of additional monetary burdens 75
and delays to an already expensive and
protracted resolution of the legal conflict.
In addition to the added expenses that a feigned summary jury trial proceeding
would probably produce and the very real possibility of an ineffectual verdict,
there also exist questions concerning how the judge will view the evidence at a
jury trial. 76 Since the judge who presides at a summary jury trial will
very often be the same judge at the trial on the merits, there is concern that a
judge may develop a bias or predisposition about the merits of the case based on
a summary jury trial at which a party may very well be reserving some of its more
powerful witnesses or information for a full scale trial.
Although this

-summary

72. Maatman, supra note 37, at 481-482; Maatman and Gilbert, supra note 59, at 22; Wiegand,
supra note 8, at _; Brenneman & Wesoloski, Blueprintfor a Summary Jury Trial, 1986 MICH. B.J.
888.
73. Maatman & Gilbert, supra note 72.
74. Maatman, supra note 37, at 475.
75. As noted in note 8, the crowded court dockets and the monetary burdens of a trial were two
of the principal reasons for the creation of the summary jury trial. Professor Wiegand notes a study
in which more than half of the attorneys participating in summary jury trials reported spending more
billable hours on a case than they would have without the summary jury trial. Wiegand, supra note
8, at _.
76. Maatman, supra note 37, at 485.
77. Id.; Developments in "Alternative"Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 115 F.R.D. 361, 370
(1987). There is also the fear that a judge who has presided over a summary jury trial wilt rely on the
summary jury trial in deciding post-trial motions. In one case, the defendant moved for a new trial
asserting that the jury decided the case based on passion and prejudice. In denying the new trial
motion, the judge noted the remarkable consistency between the jury's verdict and the summary jury
trial verdict. Caldwell v. Ohio Power Co., 710 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ohio 1989). This apprehension
is increased when considering questions concerning the reliability of a summary jury trial verdict as
mentioned in note 26.
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apprehension may be overstated, it is still a consideration in assessing the
ramifications of compelling attendance at a summary jury trial.78
Despite the drawbacks of forcing a party to participate in a summary jury trial
without requiring meaningful participation by means of sanctions, the practice may
have some redeeming attributes.79 There is still a possibility that both sides to
the dispute will get a better impression of the case and thereby be able to conduct
more meaningful settlement negotiations despite the fact that the performances at
the summary jury trial might be different than the performances at a full trial.
Judge Lambros believes that uncertainty about the jury's reaction to the case is the
biggest stumbling block to settlement, and a mandatory summary jury trial without
sanctions for feigned performance might at least work to dispel some of that
uncertainty. 8 0 The compulsory summary jury trial may also relieve parties of
risking an appearance of weakness that might be conveyed by asking for a
summary jury trial. 8 1 If one party must ask for a summary jury trial, the other
party might view this as an admission of a weak case which might make the nonmoving party more reluctant to settle at a reasonable figure. The compulsory
summary jury trial might also force into settlement proceedings parties, who, while
adamantly oposed
to settlement, find the summary jury trial useful and may end
8
settling.
up
In light of the congested dockets of the federal courts, judges probably feel
that a mandatory summary jury trial, even without sanctions for specious
participation, is worth conducting when considering the fact that much more
judicial time will be consumed should the case proceed to trial. 83 When
gambling with a half-day summary jury trial in hopes of avoiding a protracted jury
trial, judges will probably be willing to take that risk. 84 A mandatory summary
jury trial without sanctions might also work to streamline a case for trial by
narrowing the issues or merely forcing the parties to spend
more time in
85
considering how to effectively and efficiently try their cases.
Judge Lambros also believes that parties to a lawsuit often resist settlement
due to their emotional need for a "day in court" ai which they can tell their
story. 86 A summary jury trial may provide that "therapeutic release" the parties

78. Id.
79. See generally McKay, 120 F.R.D. 43.
80. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial, supra note 1, at 469.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 509. Judge Newblatt of the Eastern District of Michigan wrote to Judge Lambros
detailing a summary jury trial proceeding into which the parties came adamant against the possibility
of settlement but they ended up settling before trial.
83. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49.
84. Id. But this idea is based on the assumption that more cases will settle before trial if judges
are allowed to order cases to summary jury trials. This assumption has not been proven. See, e.g.,
Posner, supra note 2.
85. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial, supra note 1, at 468.
86. Id.
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experience as a result of participating in a legal proceeding and may also allow the
parties to analyze their individual cases in ways other than through their attorney's
counsel.8 7 The opportunity to view the case firsthand may be especially
preferable to viewing the case through the attorney
since traditionally the attorney
88
"is hired as a gladiator and not a diplomat."
The list of benefits that may be gained through compulsory participation in
a summary jury trial, without the threat of sanctions to force meaningful
participation, fails to account for that class of cases in which the parties would be
willing to reveal some of the information that would otherwise be protected under
the discovery rules in hopes of procuring a settlement to the case. 89 While this
class of cases is not readily identifiable, it should at least be considered in
weighing the benefits of mandatory summary jury trials.
IV. CONCLUSION

In spite of the lengthy catalogue of possible benefits that might be derived
from a mandatory summary jury trial where no sanctions are allowed to prevent
spurious participation, the serious expectation of these benefits somehow seems
unrealistic. Would not parties being forced into a settlement procedure against
their wishes be more likely to horde information rather than risk divulging
ammunition that might later be used against them at a full trial? To ask the
question in that way is to answer it. But the question does not seem to be
unrealistically framed given the adversarial and often combative stances which
parties to litigation often occupy prior to trial.
It seems then that the practice of compelling parties, against their wishes, to
participate in a summary jury trial, regardless of whether the judge threatens
sanctions to require meaningful participation, will likely be doomed to failure due
either to the discovery rules protecting information from disclosure prior to trial
or practical considerations as to the adversarial positions parties often occupy prior
to trial.
DANIEL K. O'TOOLE

87. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 50.
88. Id.
89. It seems by the nature of work product that almost all cases will involve some degree of it
since work product encompasses nearly everything "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial"
including an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning a case.
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 386 (1985).
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